

Secure Web Services Architecture A Case Study

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Web Services

- What is it
- Why is it
- Who cares

Traditional n-Tier Web Services

- MultiTier Arches

Network Security

- Theory
- Reality
- n-Tier
- General
- Tips

Detailed Analysis of Case Study

- Systems
 - Multiple Secure Environments
 - Least Privilege
- Network
 - Protocols
- Management
 - Updates / Upgrades

Q & A

Diagram shows standard physical n=3

- Presentation – WWW
- Application – Java
- Data – DB

Each system has common security

Each system has unique security

Presentation (WWW Server)

- Some studies refer to the “Client” tier
- Considering the Client as the “Presentation”
 - JavaScript, HTML, XML

Application (CGI, J2EE, Cobol)

- Not necessarily an independent server
- Best defined by Usage
 - Applications ~= Programs

Data (dBaseIV, SQL, Contacts.TXT)

- Should not imply a DataBase in the operational sense
- Best considered as referential

Each system has common security

- IPTables
- SNORT
- OOB Logging
- Specialized user accounts

IPTables

- No FORWARD allowed
- Deny & LOG explicit
 - Sent to OOB

SNORT

- Phantom Interface
- OOB Logging Output (syslog)

OOB Logging

- Serial syslog

Specialized user accounts

- Apache user
- Tomcat user
- Where possible – high level ports binding

S2.1.1: Unique Security

Each system has unique security

- IPTables
- SNORT
- OOB Logging
- Specialized user accounts
- Specialized logging

IPTables

- Specific INPUT/OUTPUT filters

SNORT

- Tuned rules specific to application

OOB Logging

Specialized user accounts

- Lowest privilege possible

Specialized logging

- Per application using OOB where possible

n-Tier Architecture

- Traditional separation of processing duty.
- Similar to the concept of an exploded mainframe

But since this is “ exploded” we can actually obtain access to the points in between

Even better we can slip in and reside within the middle or back systems

Each system must adhere to ISN (define a complete Pol structure)

S2.1.3: Least Privilege

Compromise of any specific system **MUST NOT** compromise any other system

Again – ISN/PoI requirements

Parallel audit trails

OOB management / logging

CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, Accessibility

- Confidentiality

- HTTPS / Basic Auth / Certificate structures

- Integrity

- Protocol Independence / ECC

- Accessibility

- Availability of system

Apache 2.x system with SSL

- Logging through OOB

- Consider `mod_log_sql`

- IPTables only allow connections (INPUT/OUTPUT) to used ports

- Independent tables filters for each interface

S2.1.4: Application

CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, Accessibility

- Confidentiality

- HTTPS / Java Crypto / Certificate structures

- Integrity

- ECC / JMI

- Accessibility

- Availability of system

Tomcat 4.x system with SSL

- Logging through OOB

- JMI / J4L

- IPTables only allow connections (INPUT/OUTPUT) to used ports

- Independent tables filters for each interface

CIA – Confidentiality, Integrity, Accessibility

- Confidentiality
 - SSL / mhash / mcrypt / Certificate structures
- Integrity
 - ECC
- Accessibility
 - Availability of system

MySQL 4.0.x system with SSL

- Logging through OOB
- OOB (Serial) management connection
- IPTables only allow connections (INPUT/OUTPUT) to used ports

Connections between each system using different RFC1918 network.

Presentation server had default route outbound only

Application and Data server had no default routes

Full Policy Routing structures

- ip rule limited accesses exiting localhost
- No IPv4 forwarding

SNMP

- Use IPX where possible
- Use Version 3 with full authPriv and Inform traps
 - Separate passphrases for auth and Priv

Serial Logging

- AKA Out Of Band (OOB) Logging
- Consider two serial connections – one in & one out

Time Synchronisation

- Does not need to be accurate merely precise

Read Only DASD

- Especially useful for static content
- Works well with well behaved programs (Apache)

SSH / SSL

This is The